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ligations of the community were nevertheless partnership obliga-
tions, entitled to be paid from the proceeds of the partnership
sale before the proceeds were distributed to the co-owners.
During the past term, the court also decided the following
cases dealing with successions, donations, and community prop-
erty. They are Slater v. Culpepper,26 and Succession of Stans-
bury.27 These cases have been omitted from this discussion since
they involved no questions of substantial import. The court also
decided the case of Moore v. Suchei48 in which the vendor at-
tacked a notarial act of sale as being a disguised donation. This
case is discussed elsewhere in this symposium under the heading
Sale.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
There has been some question as to what extent, if any, the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation as a breach of contract
obtains in Louisiana. This question was answered in Marek v.
McHardy,1 wherein the court said that an anticipatory breach
of contract is actionable in this state. Actually plaintiff did not
institute his suit in advance of the time performance of the repu-
diated obligation was due and the only question the court had to
decide was whether, in acting on the defendant's repudiation, he
had destroyed his right to the promised performance. In the
meantime there had been no retraction. 2 The court might have
decided, therefore, that the anticipatory repudiation dispensed
with the necessity of plaintiff's continuing his own performance
without expressing an opinion as to whether he would have been
able to maintain suit for breach of contract, on the strength of
the repudiation, prior to the time performance of the repudiated
obligation was due. That is, it might have restricted its inquiry
to the question of whether plaintiff, without completing his own
performance, had a right to damages for the defendant's breach.
In view of the reciprocal nature of a commutative contract it
26. 233 La. 1071, 99 So.2d 348 (1957).
27. 234 La. 924, 102 So.2d 218 (1958).
28. 234 La. 1068, 102 So.2d 459 (1958).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 234 La. 841, 101 So.2d 689 (1958).
2. It is questionable whether under the circumstances the repudiator should
have had a power of retraction. See 4 CoaDiN, CoNTaAcTS 932, 1 980 (1951).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
seems clear that a party thereto should not be required to con-
tinue his own performance when faced with a repudiation by
the other.3 Indeed, in an appropriate case he might well be re-
quired to take no further action if his own damages would be
minimized thereby. The pronouncement of the court in the in-
stant case may lead to the acceptance in Louisiana of the body of
principles developed by the common law in cases of anticipatory
repudiation. If so this should occasion no alarm. When the
Plaintiff would be entitled on the facts to a decree of specific
enforcement the repudiation should not deprive him of his right.
4
The case of Spearman v. Willson5 arose out of an attempt by
the plaintiff to put her property beyond the reach of a creditor
who had secured a judgment against her with respect to which
a devolutive appeal had been taken. Pending the hearing on the
appeal she gave to the defendant over $10,000 in cash. However,
after the judgment was affirmed she sought recovery of the
money in order to pay it. She was only partly successful and
finally brought suit for the remainder. The action was dismissed
by the trial judge on the ground that the transaction was fraud-
ulent and contra bonos mores with the result that the plaintiff
was in no position to seek the aid of the court. This holding was
reversed on the basis of the showing that the plaintiff had en-
deavored to recover the money to pay the judgment and had
actually borrowed enough and paid it. The fraudulent purpose
had thus not been consummated. Presumably the plaintiff had
had a change of heart. If so, she was entitled to endeavor
to undo the wrong she had planned and was entitled to the sup-
port of the law in the effort. Having paid the judgment, she was
not in pari delicto with the transferee who was, in turn, in no
position to say that the bargain was illegal. 6
An attempt by a debtor to shield his property from the pur-
suit of his creditors through the device of a fraudulent mortgage
was found ineffective in Baton Rouge Production Credit Asso-
ciation v. A. G. Alford The evidence of the fraudulent nature
of the transaction was clear. The court also held that the holder
of the mortgage to whom it had been sent after the institution
of the instant suit to have it cancelled was not an indispensable
3. See LaRose v. Dufresne, 234 La. 42, 99 So.2d 16 (1958).
4. See 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 976 (1951).
5. 234 La. 82, 99 So.2d 31 (1958).
6. See 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1465 (1950).
7. 235 La. 117, 102 So.2d.866 (1958).
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party. Reliance was on a rule, adopted in certain common law
jurisdictions, that litigants are exempted from taking any notice
of a title acquired during the pendency of a suit. Although it
may be proper to say that the transferee was not an indis-
pensable party to the instant litigation, there yet appears some
question as to whether the judgment rendered would be effective
as to him in the light of our statute providing for the filing of
a notice of lis pendens.8 Was not the mortgage a real right con-
stituting immovable property within the statutory provision?
The parol evidence rule was involved in Tessier v. LaNasa.9
The defendant, a prospective purchaser, sued by a real estate
broker for a commission, defended on the ground that he signed
the written offer to buy the property on the oral condition and
assurance that the agent would obtain a $100,000 loan for him,
and that he had not done so. The majority opinion found the
evidence admissible on the theory that it was offered not to con-
tradict the writing but to show that it did not manifest the in-
tention and meaning of the parties. Justice McCaleb, in a con-
curring opinion, justified the consideration of the evidence on
the ground that the suit was not on the written contract for the
purchase and sale of the property but on the oral agency agree-
ment which was not expressed in the writing. The owner of the
property had never sought to enforce the offer to buy, although
he had accepted it soon after it was submitted. There is consid-
erable jurisprudential authority for the view that the evidence
in question would serve simply to show that the proposal was
not to be effective unless the agent succeeded in making ar-
rangements for the loan, i.e., that it was delivered conditionally
only.10 On the other hand, the admissibility of such evidence has
been supported on the theory that the writing is not a complete
integration of the agreement and proof of the condition serves
merely to establish the entire agreement between the parties.1
Under either theory the evidence would have been admissible at
common law and it is at least doubtful that Article 2276 would
require a different result with us despite its unduly broad Ian-
8. LA. R.S. 13:3541 (1950). "The pendency of an action in any court, state
or federal, in the state affecting the title, or asserting a mortgage or lien upon
immovable property, shall not be considered or construed as notice to third persons
not parties to such suit, unless a notice of pendency of such action shall have been
made, filed or registered, in compliance with R.S. 13:3541 through 13:3543."
9. 234 La. 127, 99 So.2d 56 (1958).
10. See Mire v. Haas, 174 So. 374 (La. App. 1937), and authorities there cited.
11. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 323, § 589 (1950).
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guage.1 2 The condition was not in contradiction of the writing.18
Although there is considerable doubt concerning the scope of
the application of Article 1900 of the Civil Code,' 4 it seems to
have been correctly applied in Stephens v. Anderson-Dunham,
Inc.15 The defendant was allowed to prove that whereas the
cause recited in support of a promise to pay a royalty was serv-
ices to be rendered, which were admittedly not rendered, there
was another true and sufficient cause. The plaintiff was not
undertaking to contradict a recital of the cause for the purpose
of invalidating the contract but was undertaking to show the
true cause in order to sustain it, which seems to be exactly what
the article permits.
The issue before the court in Knox v. W. E. Parks Lumber
Co.' 6 was whether the purchaser of standing timber was entitled
to extend the period for its removal by paying an agreed amount.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant was to have the right to do so
only if the removal could not be completed within the primary
term, i.e., only if it was impossible for him to remove it. The
court rejected this interpretation. Its view was that the defend-
ant was entitled to the extended term if for any reason he did not
cut and remove the timber within the primary term. It also
found that plaintiff's action in retaining for some three months
defendant's check sent to support the election to extend the term
operated to extend it. Although the language of the court seemed
to apply only to the one-year extension in question, it affirmed
the judgment of the district court which maintained the agree-
ment for any future extension as well. It well might be, how-
ever, that this could not be permitted to continue indefinitely
although the contract imposed no time limit for the extensions
from year to year. The court might have to find eventually that
only a reasonable period of time was intended.
In Sonnier Electric Co. v. J. M. Brown Construction Co.17 the
plaintiff, a sub-contractor under a government contract, was held
12. See Salley v. Louviere, 183 La. 92, 162 So. 811 (1935).
13. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 322, § 589 (1950).
14. "If the cause expressed in the consideration (contract) should be one that
does not exist, yet the contract cannot be invalidated if the party can show the
existence of a true and sufficient consideration (another true and sufficient
cause)." The italicized words give the correct translation from the French. This
article is considered at length in Comment, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 427 (1941).
15. 234 La. 237, 99 So.2d 95 (1958).
16. 234 La. 964, 102 So.2d 232 (1958).
17. 234 La. 540, 100 So.2d 499 (1958).
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on the basis of the sub-contract entitled to the benefits provided
by the prime contract as well as bound by its provisions other-
wise. The court's disposition of the case accorded with the agree-
ment between the parties and also satisfied the ends of justice.
Both plaintiff and defendant seem to have profited by the gen-
erosity of the Corps of Engineers in making an adjustment be-
cause of a called work suspension.
In Pechon v. National Corporation Service, Inc.,18 an employ-
ment contract was found to be for an indefinite time and there-
fore terminable at will.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
SALE
J. Denson Smith*
The case of Wells v. Joseph' raises a serious question affect-
ing the public records doctrine. The decision held that an un-
recorded tax redemption was effective against a purchaser from
the heirs of the tax adjudicatee in his suit to quiet title. Al-
though the redemption had not been recorded, there were of rec-
ord a judgment sending the heir of the tax debtor into possession
of the property and other subsequently recorded instruments.
From this the court reasoned that having been put on inquiry as
to the title since the public records revealed that there were other
claimants to the property, and that a lawsuit to establish owner-
ship would be necessary, the purchaser must be considered as
having bought at his peril and risk. In view of the fact that the
case is being noted elsewhere in this issue, no extensive comment
will be here made. Granting that the instruments of record may
have put the plaintiff on inquiry, an investigation of the title
could have led at most to the discovery of the unrecorded redemp-
tion. But this leaves unanswered the question of whether the un-
recorded redemption could be held effective against the plaintiff
without doing violence to established principles of registry. The
public records doctrine holds that all unrecorded sales, contracts,
and judgments affecting immovable property are utterly null
and void as to third parties even when they know of their ex-
18. 234 La. 397, 100 So.2d 213 (1958).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 234 La. 780, 101 So.2d 667 (1958).
